Partial equilibrium analysis has a conceptual dilemma that its object should be negligibly small so as not to affect allocation of the other commodities but then the consumer does not care for it and the notion of willingness to pay for it does not make sense. In the setting of a continuum of commodities, we propose a limiting procedure which transforms the many-commodity environment into a partial singlecommodity environment. In the limit, the notion of willingness to pay for a commodity is established as a 'density' notion and the absence of income effect on it is established.
Introduction

The Marshallian notion of smallness of a commodity
Partial equilibrium analysis, which involves the notions of willingness to pay, inverse demand and consumer's surplus, relies on the assumption that there is no income effect on the commodity under consideration. Let x denote the quantity of the commodity and a denote the associated income transfer which is either positive (when received) or negative (when paid). The analysis assumes that the consumer has so-called quasi-linear preference which is represented in the form u(x, a) = v(x) + a or its monotone transformation. It exhibits that the marginal rate of substitution of income transfer for the commodity, marginal willingness to pay for it in other words, takes the form S(x, a) = v (x), which is independent of a. This means there is no income effect on the commodity under consideration.
In order to justify this assumption which is nowadays formulated like above (at least after Hicks [2] ), Alfred Marshall wrote "... assume that other things remain equal (Principle of Economics [3] , p.207)." However, the only thing that can keep other things remaining equal is, in general, nothing. This is the dilemma we tackle in the current paper. The dilemma can be restated that if a commodity is really a negligible piece of the entire set of commodities then the consumer does not care for it and the notion of willingness to pay for it does not make sense.
Vives [5] is the first paper which provides a formal treatment of the above problem (see also Hayashi [1] ). He considers an increasing sequence of sets of commodities, and under certain assumptions shows that income effect on each single commodity vanishes as the number of commodity and income tend to infinity at the same rate. 1 This approach, however, does not allow handling eventually (countably) infinitely many commodities, since it assumes that all commodities have the uniform degree of importance, which cannot be true in the limit. Due to this and also to the assumption that income grows to infinity, the notion of 'limit preference' or 'preference in the limit' is hard to obtain, and hard to interpret even if obtained.
There is another issue, though related to the above, which is left unclear: what do we mean by income transfer when we are doing partial equilibrium analysis? There income transfer is supposed to be the 'composite of all the others' than the commodity under consideration. However, when the amount of the commodity we focus on changes it will in general change the composition of the amounts of the other commodities, which in turn changes how the consumer evaluates income transfer. The traditional explanation is again that when the commodity is negligibly small it does not change the composition of everything else. This turns into the above-noted dilemma again.
Our aim is to provide an alternative limiting procedure which resolves the dilemma and converts the many-commodity setting into the leading formula in an operational and 1 See Miyake [4] for an alternative approach.
intuitive manner. We also aim to clarify what we mean by income transfer when we are doing partial equilibrium analysis.
Subdivision and magnification
We take a reverse direction somehow. We present the whole set of commodities in the outset, which is a continuum, and subdivide it into many pieces so that each piece tends to be arbitrarily small. The continuum assumption might look odd, but it applies not only to the case of finely differentiated commodities, but also to resource allocation under uncertainty with a continuum of states and intertemporal resource allocation with continuous time.
Also, more importantly, it is a reasonable framework for precisely describing what we mean by 'negligible.' To resolve the above-stated dilemma, we propose to go through an operation what we call subdivision and magnification. We think it is a reasonable description of how an economist does or should transform general equilibrium analysis into partial equilibrium analysis.
The example below illustrates the proposed procedure and how it works.
be a finite interval of commodity characteristics and µ be the Lebesgue measure. Given an integrable function g : T → R and a measurable set I ⊂ T ,
Consider that a consumer has Cobb-Douglas preference, which is represented by ∫
where f (t) denotes the consumption of commodity t ∈ T and γ(t) denotes the weight on it.
Price system p is given an integrable function which maps each t ∈ T into a positive number. Also we consider a fixed level of base income w > 0.
We formulate the process of subdivision in the form an increasing partition {I n } of the set of commodity characteristics. For simplicity, we take it to be generated by the binary expansion, where
for each n. Notice that for every t ∈ T , there exists a unique sequence {I n (t)} such that I n (t) ∈ I n and lim inf I n (t) = lim sup I n (t) = t.
At each step of subdivision, we consider that the consumer is given a finite number of commodities, namely, |I n | goods. That is, given n and each J ∈ I n , we assume that the consumption amount is constant on J.
Given n, pick I ∈ I n to be the object of partial equilibrium analysis in the approximate sense. In the limit, the set I is supposed to shrink to a point. Let x be the consumption amount which is constant over the set I. Let a be the amount of income transfer which is accompanied with the consumption of each element of the set. Notice that it refers to the incremental change of income, and it differentiates from the given level of base income.
Since the mass of the piece is µ(I), the total income transfer which is accompanied with the consumption of the commodity piece is aµ(I).
As I tends to be small then the income transfer becomes small as well compared to the base income. However, as we will see below, the proportion between the magnitude of income transfer and that of consumption of the commodity piece remains positive in the limit. This is what we mean by magnification, since we are somewhat magnifying (or renormalizing) the magnitude of income transfer by adjusting it to the smallness of the commodity piece.
Evaluation of the income transfer is determined by means of Hicksian aggregation.
Consider that given a pair of consumption of the commodity piece and income transfer (x, a), the consumer chooses amounts of the other |I n |−1 pieces of commodities (z J ) J∈I n \{I} so as to solve the maximization problem
.
Now let
be the indirect utility function given by the conditional optimal consumption. This represents the induced preference over two goods, one is the commodity piece I and the other is income transfer associated with it. Then we have
Thus, the marginal rate of substitution of the numeraire good (income transfer) for the
, is given by
Without loss of generality, pick τ ∈ T as the object of partial equilibrium analysis in the limit. Since commodity τ by itself is a really negligible piece which does not affect consumer's valuation, we take a 'neighborhood' of it with a positive mass, which is given by the element F n which contains τ . Denote it by I n (τ ). Also, let S I n (τ ) = S n,I n (τ ) .
As n → ∞, I n (τ ) converges to {τ }. From the fundamental theorem of calculus we
which is independent of a.
Thus we obtain a limit preference over (x, a) which is quasi-linear. In the limit, the marginal rate of substitution of income transfer to commodity τ , marginal willingness to pay in other words, is obtained as a positive number. There is no income effect in the limit, in the sense that the marginal willingness to pay depends on the base income level (w) but is independent of how much the income transfer (a) is.
We should emphasize the distinction between the income level which is determined at a general equilibrium level, and income transfer made at a partial equilibrium level. The absence of income effect presumed in partial equilibrium analysis should refer to that the marginal willingness to pay is independent of the second kind of income change.
Let us illustrate further, with a some more general case.
Example 2 As before, let T be the set of commodity characteristics. Consider separable preference which is represented by ∫
T v(f (t), t)dµ(t).
Again, given n, pick I ∈ I n to be the object of partial equilibrium analysis in the approximate sense.
Given a price system p and base income w, consider the maximization problem
Assume interior solution, by delegating the precise argument to the later section. Then we have a Lagrange multiplier λ n,I (a) > 0 such that
J (a)) J∈I n \{I} , which is independent of x because of additive separability and differentiable in a under suitable assumption.
By differentiating the budget equation by a, we have
be the indirect utility function given by the conditional optimal consumption. Then we
Thus, the marginal rate of substitution of the numeraire good for the commodity piece
It is more generally shown in the later section that the sequence {λ I n (τ ) (a)} converges (after taking a subsequence if necessary) to a constant λ * which is independent of a, where the limit λ * is given as the Lagrange multiplier for the problem (we call it unconditional
Also, let f * be the solution to the unconditional problem.
Then, from the fundamental theorem of calculus we obtain
From the first-order condition, one may replace λ * by
for some arbitrarily fixed σ ∈ T .
In the main part of the paper, we provide the characterization of the induced two-good preference and the limit theorem for general preferences that are not necessarily separable.
Main results
Consumption space
Let T = [a, b] be a finite interval, Σ be the family of Lebesgue measurable sets, and µ be the Lebesgue measure.
Let L ∞ (T ) be the space of essentially bounded measurable functions from T to R, which is endowed with the sup norm. Denote the norm dual of
Let L 1 (T ) be the space of Lebesgue integrable functions from T to R, which is endowed with the integral norm. It is known that L 1 (T ) can be viewed as a subset of L ∞ (T ) * =
ba(T ). There the dual operation takes the form
. Given an integrable function g : T → R and a measurable set I ∈ Σ, let
Let S ⊂ R m be a compact set and consider a sequence of functions from S to L 1 (T ), denoted by {f ν }. Say that {f ν } weakly converges to f uniformly on S if
Let L ∞ + (T ) be the set of essentially bounded measurable functions which are nonnegative almost everywhere. Define
and define L 1 ++ (T ) and L 1 +++ (T ) similarly. We take L ∞ +++ (T ) to be the consumption space.
The process of subdivisions is, for simplicity, is described by a sequence of increasing partitions, denoted {I n }, to be generated by the binary expansion, as
for each n. Notice that for every t ∈ T , there exists a unique sequence {I n (t)} such that I n (t) ∈ I n and lim inf I n (t) = lim sup I n (t) = t. Also, given g ∈ L 1 (T ), n and I ∈ I n , let
Basic assumptions
Let U : L ∞ +++ (T ) → R be a representation of the preference. Here we list the basic assumptions on the representation U . The assumptions below involve some cardinal information about the representation. One may write them down in terms of marginal rate of substitution as is done in Hayashi [1] . However, for simplicity of the argument we take the current description.
Regular Preference:
Under first-order differentiability and quasi-concavity, the following claim holds.
and
Proof. To show the first part, suppose U (g) U (f ). Then by quasi-concavity we have
for all α ∈ (0, 1). As α → 0, the first-order differentiability assures that the left-hand-side converges to DU (f ), g − f , which is non-negative in the limit.
To show the second part, suppose U (g) > U (f ) and DU (f ), g − f 0. Since DU (f ) = 0, by norm continuity of U and the linear operator DU (f ) one can take h ∈ L ∞ +++ (T ) so that U (h) > U (f ) and DU (f ), h − f < 0, which is a contradiction to the previous part.
We make some assumption about the preference induced on the finite dimensional subspaces generated by {I n }.
Regular Preference on Finite Dimensions:
(i) For all n, the restriction of U onto the finite-dimensional subspace R I n , denoted by U n : R I n ++ → R, where
We assume that the Inada-type condition holds in the uniform manner across {I n }, which is parallel to what Vives [5] assumes for increasing numbers of commodities.
Uniform Inada Property:
There exist non-increasing functions φ, φ from R ++ to R ++ such that
(ii) φ(y) → ∞ as y → 0 and φ(y) → 0 as y → ∞;
The last basic assumption is about wealth and prices.
Wealth and Prices:
(i) w > 0; (ii) p ∈ L 1 +++ (T ) and there exist p, p with 0 < p < p such that p(t) ∈ [p, p] for almost all t ∈ T .
Hicksian aggregation
Definition 1 Given n and I ∈ I n , the relation n,I over
is defined by
respectively.
Induced 2-good preference
Fix n and I ∈ I n , and consider the maximization problem
From the assumptions made on the finite-dimensional subspaces, the above maximization problem has a unique solution in the interior for each n and I ∈ I n . Hence we can resort to the first order condition: there exists λ n,I > 0 such that
. From the second-order differentiability assumption, the solution, denoted z n,I (x, a) = (z n,I
J (x, a)) J∈I n \{I} , is differentiable in (x, a) . Also, we have the corresponding Lagrange multiplier as a differentiable function of (x, a), hence we denote it by λ n,I (x, a).
By differentiating the budget equation by x, we have
By differentiating the budget equation by a, we have
J (x, a) ∂a = µ(I).
Now let
Thus we obtain the characterization of the induced preference.
Proposition 1
Given n, the marginal rate of substitution of the numeraire good for the
, takes the form
Behavior of the conditional demand
First we show that the conditional demand choice is uniformly bounded from above and below.
Lemma 2 There exist z, z with 0 < z < z and λ, λ with 0 < λ < λ, such that
for all n, (x, a) ∈ C and I ∈ I n , J ∈ I n \ {I}.
Proof. First we show the uniform boundedness from above. Suppose not. Then without loss of generality there is {(x n , a n ), I n , K n } such that
Then we have
By the assumed property of φ, we have φ
from the first-order condition, we have λ n,I n (x n , a n ) → 0.
On the other hand, also from the first order condition, we have max
hence the left hand side converges to zero.
From the uniform boundary condition again, we have max
) .
From the assumed property of φ, we have min
we have min
which is a contradiction to the previous claim.
Uniform boundedness from below can be shown similarly. Since consumption is uniformly bounded from above and below, the corresponding Lagrangean multipliers are also bounded from above and below.
Next we discuss the comparative statics property of the conditional demand. From the second-order argument, we have
Given n and I ∈ I n , let H n,I (z) be the |I n | × |I n | matrix obtained by deleting the Here we assume that the sensitivity terms given above are uniformly bounded. Here we are assuming the condition which just makes income effects uniformly bounded, and not assuming that the income effect on each commodity piece vanishes, though it turns out to be true eventually.
I-row and the I-column of H n (z). That is,
H n,I (z) = ( D 2 −I U n (z) D −I U n (z) t D −I U n (z) 0 ) . For each J ∈ I n \ {I}, let H
Uniform Boundedness of
Also note that the above conditions are stated directly as a property of the preference, the primitive, not as a property of the derived conditional demand function.
The limit theorem
Hereafter, fix τ ∈ T arbitrarily and take I = I n (τ ), and fix a compact set C ⊂ R ++ × R.
Accordingly, rewrite z n,I by z I n (τ ) , and λ n,I by λ I n (τ ) . Also, for all sufficiently large n's, For s 1 , {f n (s 1 )} is a sequence in [z1, z1] , hence has a weak- * convergent subsequence.
Denote the convergent subsequence by {f 1,n (s 1 )}. Denote the corresponding subsequence of {f n } by {f 1,n }.
Next, consider {f 1,n (s 2 )}. It is a sequence in [z1, z1], hence has a weak- * convergent subsequence. Denote the convergent subsequence by {f 2,n (s 2 )}. Denote the corresponding subsequence of {f 1,n } by {f 2,n }. Note that both f 2,n (s 1 ) and f 2,n (s 2 ) are convergent in the weak- * sense. Now follow the diagonal argument, and let {f n,n } be the diagonal sequence that weak- * converges at each point of S d . Rewrite it by {g n }.
Pick any q ∈ L 1 (T ) and ε > 0. By the equicontinuity condition, there is δ > 0 such
for all s, s ∈ K and for all n.
Let M > 1/δ and S M be the finite subset of S d as constructed in the previous step, which is δ-dense in K. Since {g n } converges at each point of S M in the weak- * sense, there
Since q is arbitrary, {g n (s)} is a weak- * Cauchy sequence when s ∈ S is fixed. Hence {g n (s)} weak- * converges. Denote the limit by f * (s). Since [z1, z1] is weak- * compact, we
To show that the convergence is uniform, note that we already have
Now let n → ∞ while n is fixed, then we have Fix any (x, a) ∈ C. We show that f * ,τ (x, a) is a solution to the unconditional problem. x, a) ). Since the uniform weak- * convergence implies pointwise weak- * convergence, one can find x, a) ) for all sufficiently large n.
Since the subspace of simple functions is weak- * dense, one can find sufficiently large n and x1 I n (τ ) + ∑ J∈I n \{I n (τ )} z J 1 J so that it satisfies the corresponding budget constraint and its value is larger than U . However, it contradicts to the optimality given n.
From strict quasi-concavity, the unconditional problem has at most one solution. Therefore, f * ,τ (x, a) is constant over (x, a) and τ , hence rewrite it by f * .
Lemma 7
The corresponding subsequence of {λ I n (τ ) (x, a)} converges to λ * > 0 uniformly on C, which is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the solution f * given above.
Proof. Pick any C and J ∈ I k \ {I k (τ )} for some fixed k. From the first-order condition we have
As {f I n (τ ) } uniformly weak- * converges to f * , from the assumption ?? the sequence {DU (f I n (τ ) (x, a))} uniformly weakly converges to DU (f * ). Therefore the right-hand-side uniformly converges to
. Since the limit of the right-hand-side is independent of (x, a) and τ , so is the limit of the left-hand-side. Thus, let λ * ,τ be the uniform limit of λ I n (τ ) , which is constant over (x, a). Summing up, we have
Since this is true for arbitrary J ∈ I k \ {I k (τ )} and k, hence by letting J = J n (σ) for any fixed σ = τ , from the fundamental theorem of calculus, we have
Thus, λ * ,τ is the Lagrangean multiplier corresponding to f * . Since f * is independent of τ , so is λ * ,τ and we rewrite it by λ * .
We make the following assumption with regard to the limit of shrinking neighborhoods.
Continuous Marginal Utility Density
Moreover, φ(x, τ ; f ) is continuous in f in the following sense: Given any compact set S ⊂ R m , if a sequence of functions from S to L +++ (T ), denoted {f ν }, weak- * converges to f uniformly on S, then
Remark 2 In the additive separable case, this is nothing but the result of the fundamental theorem of calculus, which is applied to the function
Here we state the main result.
Theorem 1 Given any τ ∈ T and any compact set C ⊂ R ++ ×R, there exists a subsequence of {n} such that
f * is the unique solution to the problem
and λ * is the corresponding Lagrange multiplier. 2
Remark 3
It follows from the first-order condition that the limit may be written as
where σ ∈ T is arbitrarily fixed.
Proof. From the assumption of Continuous Marginal Utility Density, we have
where
Since f I n (τ ) (x, a) uniformly weak- * converges to f * , the right-hand-side uniformly converges to zero, from the assumption of Continuous Marginal Utility Density.
Combining this with the fact that {λ I n (τ ) (x, a)} converges to λ * > 0 uniformly on C, we obtain the desired result.
We provide some examples of how to calculate marginal utility density.
Example 3
Consider the weighted expected utility preference
where ν is absolutely continuous with respect to µ.
By direct calculation, we have
Hence the marginal utility density of commodity τ ∈ T at quantity x is
Notice that in the expected utility case with w being a constant, say 1, it reduces to
Example 4 Let
where µ is simply the Lebesgue measure.
Notice that in the additive case with β being a constant it reduces to e −βτ u (x).
Here we provide one characterization of the marginal utility density, under an additional assumption. Given a consumption vector f , the marginal utility density of commodity τ ∈ T at quantity f (τ ) is equal to the Frechet derivative, an integrable function from T to R under our assumption, evaluated at τ .
Proposition 2
Assume additionally that for all f ∈ L ∞ +++ (T ) and almost all τ ∈ T , and B ∈ Σ with τ ∈ I,
Proof. From the derivative formula for a composite function, we have By the fundamental theorem of calculus, the right-hand-side converges to DU (f )(τ ).
Application: from general equilibrium to partial equilibrium
Definition 2 Given m individuals, an allocation of commodity τ ∈ T , denoted (x i ) i=1,··· ,m , is said to be a partial equilibrium allocation given price p(τ ) if (ii) Given an interior allocation (f i ) i=1,··· ,m , suppose there exists p, which is bounded from above and away from zero, such that for almost all τ ∈ T , (f i (τ )) i=1,··· ,m is a partial equilibrium allocation under price p(τ ). Then (f i ) i=1,··· ,m is a Pareto efficient allocation.
Proof. (i)
The first-order condition in the general equilibrium tells that
for all i = 1, · · · , m and almost all τ ∈ T .
Pick almost any τ ∈ T , then since φ i (f i (τ ), τ ; f i ) = DU i (f i )(τ ) for each i, we have
for each i.
(ii) Suppose there exists p such that
for each i and almost all τ ∈ T . Then, since φ i (f i (τ ), τ ; f i ) = DU i (f i )(τ ) for each i and almost all τ ∈ T , we have
Now suppose (f i ) i=1,··· ,m is not Pareto efficient, that is, there exists a feasible allocation
,··· ,m such that U i (g) U i (f ) for all i and U i (g) > U i (f ) for some i. Then, we have
for all i and
for some i. Hence we have p,
which contradicts to the feasibility of (g i ) i=1,··· ,m .
Concluding remarks
There are still some open questions.
• Do we have any kind of uniformity across commodities?
• What is the rate of convergence?
• What if the set of commodity characteristics has an infinite measure?
• What if not all the other commodities are marketed?
